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In the months since the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker and
United States v. Fanfan,' federal district court judges have had greater freedom to
sentence than in the preceding seventeen years. This article analyzes to what
extent, and how, district courts have embraced their new freedom. Despite a few
judges' comments to the contrary, sentencing pursuant to Booker does not equate
with the discretionary world of pre-Guidelines sentencing. The freedom to
sentence today is moderated by the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University. I would like to thank Dean
Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, Professor Michael Vitiello, and the editors of the McGeorge Law Review for
organizing and hosting this symposium.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Throughout this article Booker will be used to refer to the Supreme Court
opinion for these combined cases.
2. As Judge Nancy Gertner stated the matter, "advisory does not mean a regime without rules, or a
return to the standardless sentencing which preceded the SRA." United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365,
367 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrHOUT ORDER (1972)).
Judge Bataillon said: "[T]he contention that Booker signals a return to pre-Guidelines discretion is an
overstatement. In contrast to the unfettered and unreviewable discretion to sentence a defendant at any point
within a broad statutory range that existed prior to the Guidelines, a sentencing court's discretion is now
constrained by the notion of 'reasonableness."' United States v. Kelley, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1035 (D. Neb.
2005).
649
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appellate review for reasonableness. Within those boundaries, district courts are
making choices that provide insight into what is working in federal sentencing
and what needs reconsideration.
This examination of district court sentencing post-Booker has immediate
importance in explaining how courts are interpreting that watershed opinion. Of
course, appellate courts are already reviewing district court decisions and
developing the law for each circuit on the key issues. So, as a measure of what
the law of sentencing will ultimately be after Booker, district court sentencing
memoranda are of only limited value. What these sentencing documents do
provide, however, is a picture of what federal district judges believe are the
important issues with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines today. After reviewing
hundreds of post-Booker cases, this article identifies the key areas of concern
discussed by district court judges. The article also identifies how these concerns
arise from the main themes of discretionary sentencing.
This article first sketches the change from discretionary sentencing to
mandatory sentencing before Booker and follows with a brief summary of
Booker. The examination of post-Booker cases illustrates how trial courts have
interpreted and applied Booker. Given Booker's lengthy, two-part majority
opinion by two different Justices, there is a great deal of language for lower
courts to interpret and use as fodder for their positions. This article identifies and
discusses the key issues that have arisen for district courts in the wake of Booker:
how much deference district courts should give the Guidelines, how Booker has
renewed consideration of previously resolved disputes about sentencing
procedures, and the major areas where judges are choosing to give non-
Guidelines sentences.3
An examination of the sentences imposed post-Booker identifies how district
courts judges believe they should sentence federal criminal defendants when they
have the freedom to do so.4 Various factors that could influence a judge's
sentencing choices are considered and common themes underlying their choices
are identified. Most of these judges have many years of experience sentencing
under the Guidelines. The choices they have made post-Booker can enlighten the
conversation of all involved in the next stage in sentencing history. Hopefully the
administration, the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), and
Congress will seriously consider the voices of these district court judges as they
determine their respective responses to Booker.
3. This article will use the term "non-Guidelines sentence" to refer to a sentence where the court either
did not sentence a defendant within the range prescribed by the Guidelines, including any applicable departures
or enhancements, or where the court explicitly stated it was imposing a non-Guidelines sentence.
4. Statutory mandatory minimum sentences still restrict a court's freedom to sentence according to
principles of punishment.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The twentieth century saw the rise of, and the demise of, rehabilitative
sentencing. In the early part of the century, the previous concept of punishment
as retribution was criticized.5 The focus of sentencing was accordingly shifted
from the gravity of the criminal act to the dangerousness of the offender.6 All
states and the federal government developed sentencing schemes in which an
initial indeterminate sentence was imposed and later reviewed by a parole board.7
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the initial indeterminate sentence was
imposed by a judge, but a few states used jury sentencing.8 Sentencing was
viewed as a professional decision about the individual that, at least theoretically,
focused on what would be required for rehabilitation.
The pendulum began to swing the other way and, by the 1970s, judges and
scholars were loudly questioning the unfettered discretion in sentencing,
probation, and parole decisions. 9 Recent history has led many observers and
commentators to view disagreements over sentencing as a pitched battle between
Congress and federal judges, but the original quest to limit disparity was
championed by judges. Indeed, Judge Marvin E. Frankel's 1973 work, Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order,'0 was one of the most influential calls for change.
He contended that judges had too much discretion and applied their own values,
there were no unifying principles behind sentencing, and there was substantial
disparity in sentencing."
Others disagreed, explaining that discretionary sentencing did have common
underlying principles. One study described the core concepts of discretionary
sentencing as evaluating the harm caused, determining blameworthiness, and
predicting the consequences of a sentence.'2 Then, after this evaluation, the court
had to translate these assessments into a sentence. The translation of the
assessment of harm, blameworthiness, and ccnsequences into an actual
sentencing was the source of the disparity in discretionary sentencing."
In response to the growing concern over disparity, various sentencing models
were considered. Some suggested the imposition of appellate review, as was used
5. Deborah Young, Fact-finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 299, 307 (1993-1994) (citing Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for
Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 823-24 (1968)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Arthur W. Campbell, LAW OF SENTENCING 258 (2d ed. 1991).
9. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962), reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 243,252 (1987).
10. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
11. Id.
12. STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITrING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINALS (1988).
13. Id. at9-10.
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in England.'4 By the 1970s, states were beginning to use determinate sentencing
schemes and the United States Board of Parole had adopted a Guideline Table in
which sentences were determined by the severity of the offense and the inmate's
previous criminal record. 5
The complex history and development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
has been recounted in many fine articles. This article highlights only a few key
decisions, the fundamental turning points in guidelines development, and the key
cases leading up to Booker. Choices made by the Commission and the courts that
seemed final at the time have emerged again as open to question after Booker. In
looking back at the developmental history now, it becomes apparent that where
no consensus was achieved about key decisions, there are now differences among
sentencing judges.
In the same year Congress established the United States Sentencing
Commission, it also adopted several mandatory minimum statutes for drug and
weapons offenses. '6 These mandatory minimums presaged the diminishment of
judges' discretion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines imposed. Initially,
prosecutors charged in the indictment facts establishing the basis for a mandatory
sentence, such as the quantity of the drug or the presence of a weapon. These
facts were then either proved at trial to the jury or admitted in a guilty plea. But
in 1986, the Supreme Court considered mandatory minimums in the context of a
Pennsylvania state law that provided a minimum sentence of five years
imprisonment for specified felonies if the court found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission
of the felony. 7 Defendant McMillan argued that visible possession was an
element of the offense or, in the alternative, that Due Process required it be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 The Supreme Court upheld the statute
against the claim, saying the weapon possession was a sentencing factor,
although Justice Stevens strongly dissented.' 9 Thus, when guidelines sentencing
began in 1987, there was precedent for judicial fact-finding of "sentencing
factors" that mandated specific sentences.
The Guidelines identified three objectives Congress had for sentencing: (1)
honesty, (2) uniformity, and (3) proportionality. 0 The Commission explained
each of these. By honesty, the Commission meant transparency, so that the
14. Young, supra note 5, at 318 n.116.
15. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223,229 (1993).
16. For a summary of the history of mandatory minimum penalties in the United States, see U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES].
17. McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
18. Id. at 84-93.
19. Id. at 93-94.
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 1, Part A (1987), reprinted in U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA 1.1 cmt. background (2005).
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sentence a judge imposed would be the sentence served, unaltered by subsequent
parole decisions.2 ' Uniformity referred to the effort to narrow the "wide disparity
in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct by
similar offenders. 22 Proportionality meant imposing "appropriately different
sentences for criminal conduct of different severity."23
While the second goal of uniformity refers to "similar offenders," both the
second and third goals, as translated into the Guidelines, focused primarily on
defining and measuring the criminal conduct. The degree of similarity among
offenders was translated into the Guidelines as a measure of a defendant's
criminal history. Other aspects of a defendant's life that might have previously
been considered as mitigating or exacerbating factors were largely excluded from
consideration under the Guidelines. The Guidelines explicitly stated that age,24
education and vocational skills,5 mental and emotional conditions,26 physical
condition or appearance, drug or alcohol dependence or abuse, gambling
addiction,27 employment record,28 family ties and responsibilities, 29 military, civic
or charitable or public service and similar prior good works, lack of guidance as a
youth, and circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing were all factors
deemed "not ordinarily relevant" in determining the sentence or determining a
departure. The single aspect of a defendant's life that is routinely considered
relevant under the Guidelines is the defendant's criminal history.30
Accordingly, the Guidelines system that was created was heavily focused on
the criminal conduct, and much less so on characteristics and circumstances of
the defendant. The offense conduct that forms the basis for determining the
offense level in the Guidelines refers not just to the conduct charged in the
indictment or information, but to all relevant conduct. The relevant conduct
provisions were an effort to shift the Guidelines system from one end of the
spectrum, a charge offense based assessment of criminal conduct, toward a "real
offense based assessment" of criminal conduct. Adjustments can be made to the
offense level based on such factors as the defendant's role in the offense.3
Over time, the Guidelines system became even more real offense based, as
opposed to charge offense based. As challenge after challenge was brought over
the relevant conduct provisions, courts determined that relevant conduct could
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.I (2005).
25. Id. § 5H1.2.
26. ld. § 5HI.3.
27. Id. § 5H1.4.
28. Id. § 5H1.5.
29. Id. § 5H1.6.
30. Id. § 5H1.8.
31. Id. § 5H1.7 (2005) (noting that the defendant's role in the offense was relevant for determining, but
not departing from, the applicable Guideline range).
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include conduct beyond the statute of limitations,32 conduct for which the
defendant was never charged,33 and conduct of which the defendant was
acquitted.4 Moreover, the evidence of this relevant conduct did not have to be
evidence that would even be admissible in a trial. It could be hearsay. Each of
these rulings increased the conduct for which defendants would be held
accountable and accordingly, the length of sentences imposed.
Congress codified greater penalties, even as relevant conduct was
expansively interpreted. It also decreased the discretion of sentencing judges.
Those who watched the Guidelines develop from the very beginning witnessed a
seemingly inexorable creeping toward more severe sentences with decreasing
flexibility.35 In response to the combination of higher penalties and less judicial
discretion, judges were increasingly voicing discontent with the Guidelines by
the late 1990s. With hindsight, one can see that there was growing momentum
against the Guidelines, but the Guidelines continued to be affirmed. A key
decision that defined the scope of relevant conduct was United States v. Watts,
decided in 1997.36 A jury convicted Watts of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, but acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense.
Despite the acquittal, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense and
increased his base offense level and thus his sentence. The Supreme Court upheld
that decision, but Justice Stevens vigorously dissented, foreshadowing later
decisions including Booker.
The following year a bare majority affirmed a sentence that relied on a prior
conviction that was found by the Court under the preponderance of the evidence
standard. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States,37 the defendant was charged
with and pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the United States in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1326. The statute had a maximum penalty of two years incarceration for
illegal reentry, but up to twenty years if the initial deportation was due to
conviction for an aggravated felony.38 The court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant had committed the prior felony and sentenced the
defendant to a Guidelines sentence of eighty-five months.39 A bare majority of
the Court found the statute constitutional, holding that the fact of a prior
conviction was the sort of recidivism commonly treated as a sentencing factor.
Justice Scalia wrote a strong dissent arguing that the majority holding raised
32. See, e.g., United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 686-9S (2d Cir. 1994).
33. E.g., United States v. Pollard, 986 F.2d 44,46-47 (3d Cir. 1993).
34. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
35. The United States Sentencing Commission issued a report in May of 2004 that concluded the
average defendant in 2002 spent about double the time in jail as the average defendant in 1984. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 139(2004).
36. Watts, 519 U.S. 148.
37. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
38. 18U.S.C.§ 1326(2000)
39. Almendarez- Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
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serious constitutional issues.40 That same term the Court affirmed a trial judge's
determination of relevant conduct involving drug quantity according to the
Guidelines in United States v. Edwards."
In 1999, the Supreme Court identified, in dicta, a significant limit on judicial
fact-finding that increases a defendant's sentence. In Jones v. United States,2 the
Court held that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty... must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' 3 In
2000, the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey," converted the Jones
Court's dicta into law in a state case. The Apprendi Court declared
unconstitutional a hate crime enhancement that enabled a judge to impose a
sentence higher than the otherwise available statutory maximum based on a
finding of racial animus by a preponderance of the evidence.' In dicta, the Court
said, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' However, the five to four
split vote and the five separate opinions delivered by the Justices raised many
questions about the exact scope and importance of the Court's ruling.
Two years later, the case of Harris v. United States47 went to the Supreme
Court. Harris was convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (carrying a firearm). The
mandatory minimum for that offense was five years for carrying a firearm and
seven for "brandishing" a firearm. The court found Harris guilty of carrying a
firearm in a bench trial.'8 At the sentencing hearing, the court then found him
guilty of the brandishing, using a preponderance of the evidence standard.'9 With
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyer in
the majority, the Supreme Court affirmed -the conviction by holding that the
"brandishing" increase was similar to a traditional sentencing factor like a prior
conviction. 0 Thus, the Court ruled that Apprendi did not apply to a mandatory
minimum. Justice Breyer wrote separately, however, saying that he could not see
the difference between this case and Apprendi, although he continued to believe
Apprendi was incorrect.' Dissenting Justices Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and
40. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
42. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
43. Id. at 243 n.6.
44. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 490.
47. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 545.
51. Id. at 569.
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Ginsburg believed that raising the floor was covered by Apprendi just as raising
the ceiling was. They said such a "fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment
than what is otherwise legally prescribed.
5 2
The development of the constitutional law of sentencing continued with Ring
v. Arizona.53 In Ring, a defendant who had been sentenced to death following his
conviction for first-degree murder challenged Arizona's capital sentencing
scheme, arguing that it violated the Sixth Amendment by permitting the judge,
rather than the jury, to find the aggravating factor necessary for imposition of the
death penalty. The Court agreed with the defendant, suggesting that Apprendi's
term "statutory maximum" meant the maximum sentence that could be imposed
solely on the basis of facts found by the jury.54
The watershed case of Blakely v. Washington55 applied these Sixth
Amendment principles to a state guidelines sentencing scheme. In Blakely, a
defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping his wife. Based on the facts admitted in
Blakely's plea agreement, his crime was subject to a statutory maximum of ten
years and a "standard range" of forty-nine to fifty-three months under
Washington's sentencing guidelines 6 After hearing Blakely's wife describe the
kidnapping, however, the sentencing judge imposed an enhanced sentence of
ninety months based on his conclusion that the kidnapping involved "deliberate
cruelty."57 The issue on appeal was whether Washington's sentencing scheme
violated the Sixth Amendment by permitting the judge to impose a sentence in
excess of the maximum authorized under the guidelines based on facts not
admitted by the defendant or submitted to a jury. Relying on Apprendi, the
Court's five-member majority said yes. In Justice Scalia's words, "[w]hen a
judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has
not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the punishment,' . . . and
the judge exceeds his proper authority.""
By striking down Washington's Sentence Reform Act, the Blakely Court cast
grave doubt on the vitality of mandatory guideline schemes nationwide,
including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the wake of Blakely, lower
federal courts divided over whether and how that case applied in the federal
system. The Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari to address this issue in the
consolidated cases of United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan.5 9
52. Id. at 579.
53. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
54. Id. at 584.
55. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
56. Id. at 299-300.
57. Id. at 300.
58. ld. at 304 (citing I J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 (2d ed. 1872)).
59. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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II. THE CHANGE WROUGHT BY BOOKER
Freddie J. Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at
least fifty grams of crack cocaine. He was convicted by a jury of that offense.'
The jury had heard evidence that Booker had 92.5 grams of crack cocaine. The
mandatory minimum penalty for the offense was incarceration for ten years, with
a statutory maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment.6' The district court
followed the sentencing Guidelines as they were being interpreted at that time.
Accordingly, the judge considered all relevant conduct and found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Booker had possessed a total of 658 grams of
crack cocaine, for a base offense level of thirty-six.62 The court's additional
finding that Booker had obstructed justice resulted in an enhancement.6 3
Applying the Guidelines, the sentencing range was 360 months to life
imprisonment. 64 Had the court based the sentence solely on the 92.5 grams of
crack cocaine-the evidence presented to the jury-the Guidelines sentence
would have been 262 months.6' The judge sentenced Booker to thirty years
imprisonment.6
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that this application of the
Guidelines conflicted with Apprendi v. New Jersey6 7 as interpreted by Blakely v.
Washington."' The majority reasoned that the quantity of crack cocaine was a fact
that had to be presented to the jury because it was a "fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, 69 where the
maximum sentence was that which a "judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."' Judge
Easterbrook dissented on both procedural and substantive grounds'
The companion case of United States v. Fanfan" presented the same issues in
a case where the district court declined to sentence based on the additional
relevant conduct in a possession with intent to distribute cocaine case. The
government in Fanfan filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit and petitioned
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment. The Court granted the
petition.
60. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 509.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 510.
66. Id. at 509.
67. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
68. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
69. Booker, 375 F.3d at 510 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
70, Id. at 510 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303).
71. Id. at 515.
72. No. 03-47-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
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The Supreme Court issued a majority opinion for Booker and Fanfan in two
distinct parts, written by two Justices. First, Justice Stevens wrote, for a bare
majority including Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, an affirmation
of Apprendi. It held that, under the Sixth Amendment, "[a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict
must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 73 Justice Stevens pointed out that over time there had been an "increasing
emphasis on facts that enhance[d] sentencing ranges 7 4 and that this emphasis
increased the judge's power while reducing that of the jury. Thus, concluded
Justice Stevens,
[T]he Court was faced with the issue of preserving an ancient guarantee
under a new set of circumstances. The new sentencing practice forced the
Court to address the question how the right of jury trial could be
preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury would still
stand between the individual and the power of the government under the
new sentencing regime."
Notable in Justice Stevens's opinion was his discussion of Watts in which
acquitted conduct was the basis for a sentencing increase. Justice Stevens pointed
out that defendant Watts had not contended that the sentencing enhancement was
a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, but had presented instead a
double jeopardy claim. Thus, the issue before the Court in Booker was not raised
in Watts.
76
The second part of the majority opinion in Booker-Fanfan was written by
Justice Breyer, for a bare majority including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer addressed the remedy for the
Sixth Amendment violation described by Justice Stevens. Justice Breyer set forth
two possible remedies: the application of a jury trial requirement for all facts
relied on at sentencing or the alternative of converting the mandatory guidelines
to advisory guidelines.77 Justice Breyer's opinion opted for the latter, with Justice
Stevens supporting the former remedy in his dissenting opinion. Justice Breyer
engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of the two options. He stated that because the
language of the Sentencing Act contemplates judge, not jury, sentencing,
imposing jury fact-finding would weaken the real conduct aspect of the
Guidelines; imposition of a Sixth Amendment requirement on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines would be too complex; plea bargaining would make
73. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (citing Apprendi 530 U.S. at 490).
74. Id. at 236.
75. Id. at 237.
76. Id. at 240.
77. Id. at 246
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matters worse, i.e. less real conduct based, giving prosecutors too much power to
decide what facts to charge; and Congress would not have approved of a system
in which it was harder to adjust sentences upward than downward.78 After
concluding that "Congress, had it been faced with the constitutional jury trial
requirement, likely would not have passed the same Sentencing Act,"' 9 Justice
Breyer turned to the inquiry of which portion of the statute had to be severed to
put the act in compliance with the Sixth Amendment constitutional requirement
recognized in the first part of the Court's opinion.80
Justice Breyer then announced that the law could be made constitutional by
severing and excising two provisions: the requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)
that the Guidelines sentence, absent a justified departure, is mandatory and the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) regarding appeals with a de novo standard of
review.8' Without these provisions, Justice Breyer concluded the sentencing act
could function independently. Having excised the standard of review on appeal
by severing § 3742(e), Justice Breyer announced that the implicit standard of
review was reasonableness, which had in fact been the statutory standard until
amendments to § 3742 in 2003 provided for de novo review of departures.8
Justice Stevens, joined in his dissent by Justice Souter and in part by Justice
Scalia, criticized Justice Breyer's remedy as overbroad and contrary to Congress's
intent in passing the Sentencing Act.8 ' Justice Stevens pointed out that although the
House initially passed an advisory guidelines statute in 1984, the Senate's version of
mandatory guidelines prevailed.8' Furthermore, since the initial passage of the
Sentencing Act in 1984, Congress had decreased judicial discretion.
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion, but also
wrote separately. Justice Scalia lamented that one could not foretell whether the
remedial opinion would result in appellate review that imposed de facto mandatory
sentencing or in just one more layer of unfettered judicial discretion. Justice Thomas
wrote to explain that a narrower holding was appropriate, because the Guidelines as
applied in Booker's case resulted in an unconstitutional sentence, but did not
mandate the facial invalidation of the statute that the majority imposed.
Booker told lower courts that the Guidelines, as written, violated the Sixth
Amendment, that the remedy would be to treat the Guidelines as advisory (although
they had to be considered in each case) and that appellate review would be based on
reasonableness. But the two parts of the majority opinion do not fit together neatly.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 258.
80. Id.
81. ld. at 258-59.
82. Id. at 260-61.
83. ld. at 272.
84. Id. at 294.
s5 d at 316
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This opinion of more than one hundred pages provided lower courts with a great deal
of language on which to rely, but some of it seemingly inconsistent.
III. POST-BOOKER: KEY CHOICES FOR DISTRICT COURTS
District courts were ready when the Supreme Court issued Booker. They had
cases waiting to be sentenced and cases waiting for resentencing. The day after
Booker was decided, Judge Cassell of Utah issued the first district court opinion
analyzing this new sentencing paradigm.
A. Weight Given to the Guidelines
In the case of United States v. Wilson,86 Judge Cassell identified the key issue
for district courts as "how 'advisory' the Guidelines are" post-Booker. Judge
Cassell set forth one standard for district courts to follow. He wrote that he would
continue to give "considerable weight" or "heavy weight" to the Sentencing
Guidelines, deviating from the applicable range only "in unusual cases for clearly
identified and persuasive reasons. 87 Judge Cassell, a former law professor, wrote
a lengthy, thoughtful opinion explaining that his decision was based on the fact
that Congress had ratified the Guidelines as the appropriate sentences to achieve
the goals of the Sentencing Act.
In the Wilson opinion, Judge Cassell states that Justice Scalia accurately
described the sentencing judge's freedom: "[T]he sentencing judge, after
considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines) has full discretion, as
full as what he possessed before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within
the statutory range."'8 It is interesting that Judge Cassell describes Justice Scalia's
statement as "accurate" because there now are clearly limitations of
reasonableness and appellate review that did not exist before the Guidelines. 9
Judge Cassell further contends that the "wise exercise of that discretionary
authority" requires a judge to consider the congressional mandates of the past
sixteen years. 9° Judge Cassell recognizes the purposes of the Sentencing Reform
Act as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ("§ 3553 factors"):
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
86. 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). Judge Cassell issued a second memorandum in the case a few
weeks later. United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005).
87. Id. at 912.
88. Id. at 913-14 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 305 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
89. Id. at 914.
90. Id.
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(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner[.] 9'
Notably, at this point in his argument, Judge Cassell does not list the other
3553(a) factors courts are directed to consider, including the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, and restitution. Judge Cassell concludes that the
Guidelines sentences, having been crafted by an expert agency and refined over
fifteen years, generally achieve these congressionally-mandated purposes of
punishment.9' He also argues that further evidence that the Guidelines generally
achieve just punishment includes surveys that the Guidelines match the public's
view of appropriate sentences.93
With respect to deterrence, Judge Cassell argues that the United States
Sentencing Commission, with its staff and expertise, is in a much better position
to determine what sentences will deter than is an individual judge.94 He also cites
several studies indicating that the decline in violent crime over the past years was
due to the increased rate of incarceration.9 In considering the purpose of
rehabilitation, Judge Cassell rather succinctly states that rehabilitation is in a
secondary position for serious crimes, in part because "the court has no way of
determining whether a defendant has been rehabilitated. 96
Turning to the parsimony provision of § 3553, that a "court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary," 97 Judge Cassell concludes
that the Guidelines sentences are designed to meet the key goal of providing
sufficient punishment.9 The final reason Judge Cassell urges deference to the
Guidelines is to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity, which Judge Cassell
says "was the main goal of the Sentencing Reform Act."99 Here Judge Cassell
sees no middle ground. Judge Cassell predicts that if each judge follows his or
her own views of just punishment and adequate deterrence, the result would be
"intolerable" and a "return to the pre-Guidelines days" with "astounding
disparities. ' ° In this argument, Judge Cassell ignores both the standard of
reasonableness imposed by Booker and the opportunity for appellate review as
91. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(2) (2000)).
92. Id. at 914.
93. Id. at 916-18 (citing PETER Rossi & RICHARD BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES
AND PUBLIC VIEWS CONVERGE, 92-93, tbl.5.5).
94. Jd. at 921.
95. ld. at 918-20.
96. Id. at 921-22.
97. Id. at 922.
98. Id. at 922-24.
99. Id. at 924.
100. Id.
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possible mediating factors. Judge Cassell concludes that, "the Guidelines are the
only standard available to all judges around the country today. For that reason
alone, the Guidelines should be followed in all but the most exceptional cases."'0 '
In sum, Judge Cassell's determination to give substantial weight to the
Guidelines develops from his assessment that Congress and the Commission have
already satisfied the purposes delineated in § 3553(a)(2) in determining the
appropriate guidelines. Judge Cassell also seems to be considering the implications
for Congress of how judges interpret Booker. Judge Cassell suggests that if judges
exercise too much discretion, Congress will surely legislate against that.'
°2
In the second published district court opinion applying Booker, United States v.
Ranum,' 3 Judge Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin strongly disagreed
with Judge Cassell. Judge Adelman said that Wilson is inconsistent with the remedial
majority in Booker, which "direct[s] courts to consider all of the section 3553(a)
factors, many of which the Guidelines either reject or ignore."' ' Judge Adelman
viewed the Sentencing Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors as sometimes creating
conflicts that courts would have to resolve. Judge Cassell, in stark contrast, viewed
the Guidelines as implementing the § 3553(a)(1) factors.'"
Judge Adelman also pointed out the other provisions of § 3553(a), including
subsection (1), which directs the courts to consider "the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,"' 6 and
subsection (7), which directs courts to consider the need to provide restitution to
victims.' 7 He noted that with respect to the latter, the Guidelines explicitly forbid
departures to facilitate restitution.08
Judge Adelman reasoned that while courts must "seriously consider" the
Guidelines and give reasons for sentences outside the range, "in doing so courts
should not follow the old departure methodology."' °9 Judge Adelman went on to
state, "[t]he Guidelines are not binding, and courts need not justify a sentence
outside of them by citing factors that take the case outside the 'heartland."'" 0
Rather, courts are free to disagree, in individual cases and in the exercise
of discretion, with the actual range proposed by the Guidelines, so long
101. Id. at 925.
102. ld. at 931-32.
103. 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
104. Id. at 985-86.
105. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 916-24 (D. Utah 2005).
106. Id. at 985.
107. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
108. Id. at 986 (citing United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994)).
109. Id. at 986-87.
110. Id at 987
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as the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully supported by reasons
tied to the § 3553(a) factors."'
Judge Adelman has been one of the most prolific authors of sentencing
memoranda, having written more than two dozen in the ten months following
Booker. In those cases, some defendants were sentenced to Guidelines sentences,
but the majority received sentences below the Guidelines.
Wilson and Ranum became guideposts for other courts that then identified
their own philosophies by reference."' In the ensuing weeks, several courts
explicitly agreed with Ranum, including courts in West Virginia,"' Iowa,' "4 New
York, "' and New Mexico."6 Judge Goodwin of West Virginia weighed in with
Ranum for two main reasons. First, he said, § 3553(a) directed courts to consider
factors that were not thoroughly considered by the Guidelines, such as age,
education, and health and, second, to treat the advisory Guidelines as
presumptively reasonable would be the "equivalent of imposing a 'de facto
mandatory sentence'" on a defendant.' '7 Other courts weighed in strongly in favor
of Wilson's deference to the Guidelines, including judges in Texas,"8 North
Dakota,"9 New Mexico,'2° Nebraska, 2' and Tennessee.' 22 One judge described his
11. ld. at 987.
112. For example, an Ohio district court said, "[w]hile this Court is cognizant of the line of district court
cases which have held that the sentencing Guidelines provide the 'presumptively correct sentence' and should
be given 'heavy,' 'substantial,' or 'great' weight... it is not persuaded by their reasoning that the Guidelines
operate as a sort of 'super factor' trumping everything else in all but unusual cases." United States v. Strange,
370 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (citations omitted).
113. Judge Goodwin said, "I have taken the position articulated in United States v. Ranum [citation
omitted] and other cases, that the proper treatment of the Guideline advice is to balance it with the other
sentencing factors found in § 3553(a)." United States v. Moreland, 366 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D. W.Va.
2005).
114. United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (S.D. Iowa 2005) ("This Court adopts Judge
Adelman's view. To treat the Guidelines as presumptive is to concede the converse, i.e., that any sentence
imposed outside the Guideline range would be presumptively unreasonable in the absence of clearly identified
reasons. If presumptive, the Guidelines would continue to overshadow the other factors listed in section
3553(a), causing an imbalance in the application of the statute to a particular defendant by making the
Guidelines, in effect, still mandatory.").
115. Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
116. United States v. Pacheco-Soto, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (D.N.M. 2005) ("The Ranum approach
appropriately encourages district courts to abandon a 'fear of judging' outside the confines of the Guidelines.").
117. Moreland, 366 F. Supp. 2d at418 (S.D. W.Va. 2005) (citing Simon, 361 F. Supp. 32).
118. United States v. Harper, 360 F. Supp. 2d 833, 834 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ("Booker/Fanfan makes the
sentencing Guidelines advisory. But the opinion's clear import requires the court to give the Guidelines
substantial weight. The better reasoned decision interpreting Booker/Fanfan espouses this interpretation. See
United States v. Wilson 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). This view is especially appropriate, given
Congressional intent and guidance expressed over the years before and after the Guidelines were adopted, the
enormous input from all stakeholders to Congress and to the Sentencing Commission, and the years of study
and revision by the Sentencing Commission.")
119. United States v. Peach, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. N.D. 2005); United States v. Zastoupil, No. CI-
04-76, 2005 WL 1398689 (D.N.D. June 14, 2005).
120. United States v. Corral-Alvarez, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D.N.M. 2005).
121. United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Neb. 2005).
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approach as making the Guidelines the centerpiece of sentencing.'23 Another
court emphasized the Commission's post-Booker statement urging that courts
give substantial weight to the Guidelines.2 4
Several courts, while not expressly agreeing with Ranum, rejected the
reasoning in Wilson. Just two weeks after Wilson, Judge Bataillon of Nebraska
rejected the government's request to sentence a defendant within the Guidelines
"absent highly unusual circumstances."'25 To do that, reasoned judge Bataillon,
would "effectively convert[] the now-advisory Guidelines to mandatory
Guidelines triggering unconstitutionality in the same way the Washington
Guidelines did in Blakely."'
2 6
Judge Ellis of the Eastern District of Virginia declined to label the degree of
deference to be afforded the Guidelines. He succinctly noted that, on the one
hand, § 3553(a) did not differentiate among the various factors to be considered,
including the Guidelines sentence, but also recognized, on the other hand, that
avoiding unwarranted disparities required some benchmark, such as what the
Guidelines provided.27 Judge Ellis ultimately emphasized that, "sentencing, in
the end, must involve the exercise of judgment, i.e., a judge's discerning opinion
that results from identifying and weighing fairly all of the factors relevant to
achieving the statutory sentencing goals."' 28 Judge Collier of Tennessee reached a
middle ground as well, recognizing that Congress is in the best position to make
some determinations, such as judging which drugs are most dangerous to society,
but that the court could better make judgments about such factors as whether
someone really was a career offender.'
29
In Judge Gertner's first opinion addressing Booker, United States v. Jaber,'
30
she also declined to label the degree of deference to be afforded the Guidelines,
but expressly rejected Wilson's reasoning.' Judge Gertner concluded that Wilson
overstated the case for deference to the Commission and Guidelines because (1)
the Guidelines were not and could not be comprehensive, (2) the Guidelines did
not implement the purposes of sentencing enumerated by § 3553(a); (3) the
Commission had not developed the Guidelines through analysis as the statute had
anticipated; (4) Congress only approved the Guidelines generally, not specific
122. United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 1076243 (E.D. Tenn. May 6,2005).
123. United States v. Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103 (D. Neb. 2005).
124. Peach, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21 (citing Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, Commission on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) (testimony of Judge Ricardo H.
Hinojosa, Chair of the United States Sentencing Comm.)).
125. United States v. Kelley, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036 (D. Neb. 2005).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Bieheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (E.D. Va. 2005).
128. Id. at 594.
129. United States v. Phelps, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580, 580-90 (E.D. Tenn. 2005).
130. 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2005).
131. Prior to Booker, Judge Gertner had decided to apply the Guidelines as advisory. United States v.
Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2005).
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guidelines; (5) the Guidelines may reflect general public opinion, but not the
public's view of individual cases; and (6) there is substantial debate about
whether the Guidelines have led to crime reduction.3 2 Recognizing the
continuing importance of the Guidelines, Judge Gertner said that in each case
courts should "explain, correlate to the purposes of sentencing, cite to
authoritative sources, and be subject to appellate review."'33 She also urged the
Commission to return to its original mission of studying the effect of sentences
on the crime rate and monitoring disparity.
3 4
Some judges have decided to factor into the determination of how much
weight to give to the advisory Guidelines sentence how certain they are that the
fact-finding was accurate. For example, Judge Goodwin of West Virginia
concluded that after calculating the advisory Guidelines sentence according to the
Guidelines procedures, including the preponderance of the evidence burden of
proof, he would then calculate a "Guidelines" sentence using the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof.'35 Judge Goodwin will then evaluate the
difference between the two to "weigh the reliability of the advice provided by the
Guidelines."'36
These early opinions interpreting Booker immediately demonstrated the
difficulty in discerning the appropriate degree of deference to the Guidelines that
Justice Scalia had predicted in his dissenting opinion in Booker. 1 7 One court
characterized the debate among federal district judges as "raging."' 38 Differences
in perspective among district judges are further demonstrated by one court's
expectation that Congress will have to clarify the degree of deference to be
afforded the Guidelines, while another court eagerly awaits an appellate court
opinion to provide the clarification.
This discussion has thus far focused on the first level of difference among
judges: the named degree of deference to be given to the Guidelines, for which
great deference or just one factor among many under § 3553 are two key
descriptions. The next inquiry is, does the terminology translate into an actual
difference in sentencing? One judge may say she is giving great weight to the
Guidelines, yet impose a sentence that is fifty percent less than the advisory
Guidelines sentence. 39 Another judge may state that he is treating the advisory
Guidelines as just one factor among many, yet impose precisely the sentence
132. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 372-75.
133. Id. at 376.
134. Id.
135. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 723 (S.D. W.Va. 2005).
136. Id.
137. 543 U.S. 220, 312-14 (2005).
138. United States v. Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 1090, 1103 (D. Neb. 2005).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 1076243 (E.D. Tenn. May, 6 2005).
Although the court calculated the Guidelines sentence as either 188 to 235 months or 234 to 293 months and
said it was giving substantial weight to the Guidelines, it imposed a sentence of 156 months, in part due to the
crack-cocaine disparity. Id.
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calculated under the Guidelines. In each instance the judge may be announcing a
philosophy to be followed in subsequent cases, yet pronouncing a sentence in a
single case that does not really verify whether the judge is in fact giving great or
little deference to the advisory Guidelines.
There are many examples, however, that do indicate judges are sentencing
according to their underlying choice about how much deference to give to the
advisory Guidelines. For example, the case of United States v. Gleich
demonstrates how deferential some judges remain toward the Guidelines.'40 The
court initially sentenced Gleich under the Guidelines to ninety-seven months
imprisonment for receipt of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors
and possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors.14 ' The
defendant appealed the sentence and the appellate court ruled that a five-level
enhancement the district court had imposed under United States Sentencing
Guideline section 2G2.2(b)(4) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the
sexual exploitation of a minor was unsupported by the evidence. On remand, the
district court made clear that it believed the original sentence, and the
enhancement underlying it, were correct. The court recalculated the Guidelines
without the enhancement, resulting in a sentencing range of forty-six to fifty-
seven months incarceration. The court imposed a sentence of fifty-seven months,
giving deference to the Guidelines, rather than using the court's discretion to
impose a higher sentence. 42
Beyond the fundamental, initial determination of the weight to be given to
the Guidelines, judges are giving different weight depending on what
determination is being calculated and what evidence is being used to establish a
fact. In subsection C below, there is further discussion of the weight given, or not
given, to particular determinations, such as the offense levels for crack cocaine,
and to instances when the judges think the Guidelines do not give enough
importance to some aspect of the defendant's life. With the sheer number of
cases that district courts must sentence, Booker has quickly become accepted,
despite these differences in interpretation. By the summer of 2005, some courts
were issuing sentencing orders without even mentioning what weight to give the
Guidelines after Booker. They simply proceeded to calculate the Guidelines
sentences, determine any departures with the § 3553 factors, and impose a
sentence.1
4 3
140. No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 741921 (D.N.D. Mar. 30, 2005).
141. Id. at*l.
142. The court even stated, "[a] just and reasonable punishment is a sentence near the statutory
maximum of fifteen years rather than at the low end of the advisory Guideline range." Id. at *3.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Frappier, 377 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Me. 2005).
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B. Have District Courts Changed How They Fact-Find for the Guidelines?
In addition to determining how much weight to accord the Guidelines now
that they are advisory, district courts have had to decide whether the same fact-
finding procedures should apply post-Booker. Although the degree of deference
to the Guidelines calculation may seem like the most influential determinant of a
defendant's ultimate sentence, the procedure used to calculate the advisory
Guidelines sentence may have even greater influence in an individual case. In the
original Federal Sentencing Guidelines effective in 1987, the Commission gave
little attention to the procedures to be used at sentencing. The Commission
included three brief guidelines, sections 6AI.1, 6A1.2, and 6A1.3, to set forth
procedures.'" They provided that there had to be a pre-sentence investigation and
report (absent an explicit finding that one was not needed), that the pre-sentence
report had to be disclosed prior to sentencing so parties could state any objection
in writing, that parties had the opportunity to present information to the court
regarding any factor important to the sentencing that was in dispute, and that the
court should resolve any disputed factors. Gradually the courts interpreted the
Guidelines and subsequent policy statements that controlled the procedural
aspects of sentencing.
The burden of proof to be applied to fact-finding under the Guidelines was
much debated and much litigated long before Booker. In assessing the relevant
conduct for which a defendant is to be held accountable, every federal circuit
ultimately concluded, despite arguments by commentators to the contrary, that in
most instances the appropriate standard of proof for resolving factual disputes at
sentencing was a preponderance of the evidence. 45 In reaching this conclusion,
courts cited the Supreme Court's acceptance of the preponderance of the
evidence standard for a mandatory minimum penalty. 46 In 1991, the Sentencing
Commission amended the commentary to policy statement 6A1.3, explicitly
adding that "use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to
meet the due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes
regarding application of the Guidelines to the facts of a case."' 147 In 1997, the
Supreme Court spoke approvingly of this language in Watts when it held that a
sentencing court could consider conduct underlying an acquitted charge if that
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 6A1.1-.3 (2005). These were amended and relabeled as
policy statements in 1989. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL App. C, amend. 293 (2005).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (9th Cir.1990); United States v.
Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 492-93 (10th Cir.); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1372-73 (11 th Cir.1990);
United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441-42 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir.1989); United States v. Urrego-Linares,
879 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (4th Cir 1989.); United States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 570 (5th Cir.1989); United
States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 499 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862,
869 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
146. See, e.g., Wright, 873 F.2d at 441 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986)).
147. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL App. C, amend. 387 (2005).
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conduct was proved by a preponderance of the evidence.' 48 The following year
the Court again implicitly approved finding relevant conduct by a preponderance
of the evidence in United States v. Edwards. 1
49
In his Booker majority opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the Watts
case was in such tension with the holding of Booker.'50 Justice Stevens wrote that
Watts was not inconsistent with Booker, because in Watts the issue of a Sixth
Amendment violation of the right to a jury had not been raised. Instead, Justice
Stevens reminded us, Watts questioned the impact of the double jeopardy clause
on the Guidelines. He concluded that it was that the Court had failed to address
the issues now presented in Booker.'5
Under Booker, district courts are consistently following a predictable set of
steps in imposing sentences. Virtually every district court first calculates the
Guidelines sentence, then determines whether any upward or downward
Guidelines departures are warranted.'52 The court then considers the other factors
set forth in § 3553 and evaluates the Guidelines sentence in light of those factors.
Then the court imposes sentence. But an important issue among district courts
after Booker is whether the district court should follow all of the Guidelines rules
in determining the advisory Guidelines sentence. Some district courts have
interpreted Booker to mean that the courts are now free to make different choices
on these key issues.
Most judges have concluded that when the Supreme Court said in Booker
that sentencing courts should consider the Guidelines, that meant that the
sentencing court should continue to follow all of the procedures set forth in the
Guidelines.'53 Thus the vast majority of district courts are applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard as the burden of proof for all fact-finding
at sentencing 4 As one would imagine, courts that have stated they will give
great weight to the Guidelines determination are in agreement that they should
follow all the procedural aspects of determining the sentences that are prescribed
by the Guidelines and policy statements. They continue to determine factual
148. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
149. 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
150. 543 U.S. 220, 241.
151. Id. n.4.
152. Some defense counsel have argued that this process is too slanted toward the Guidelines. They
contend that a court should first consider what an appropriate sentence would be under the § 3553 factors
without determining the Guidelines sentence. The court should then determine the Guidelines sentence,
compare the two, and make a final decision.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (concluding that
post-Booker, in most cases, the court would "proceed just as it always has, ruling on objections to the PSR and
resolving any factual disputes to the extent they would affect the applicable Guidelines range.") "In doing so,
the Court will continue to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard and will not consider itself
restricted by the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Agostini, 365 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y..2005); United States v. Ferby,
No. 00-DR-0053A, 2005 WL 1544802 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005); United States v. Little, No. 3:02DR-27-H,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33935 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2005).
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matters at sentencing by the preponderance of the evidence as the Guidelines
state.'
Even among those who say that the Guidelines are now truly advisory and
should not be given substantial deference over other § 3553 factors, most judges
are following the Guidelines directive to determine the facts by a preponderance
of the evidence. Judge Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, an ardent
supporter of the view that the Guidelines are just one factor to be considered
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, is determining facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
Some courts that were requiring proof of facts beyond a reasonable doubt
before Booker have returned to the lower standard of preponderance of the
evidence. For example, following Blakely v. Washington56 the District of Maine
had required that "facts supporting Sentencing Guidelines enhancements be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulated to the
relevant facts or consented to judicial factfinding."' 5 7 After Booker, a court in that
district concluded that a stipulation or jury verdict was no longer necessary to
support an enhancement.' 8 The court factored in an enhancement for an
obliterated serial number in calculating a defendant's Guidelines sentence, but
then imposed a non-Guidelines sentence to make the sentence identical to the one
his co-defendant had received in his pre-Booker sentence. 59 Judge Beaty of North
Carolina held that although he had previously announced alternative sentences, in
case the Guidelines were found unconstitutional, he would not have those
sentences stand post-Booker because he had determined them by looking solely
at the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant. '60 Judge Beaty held
that those alternative sentences were "not in line with" the Booker remedial
majority's decision.' 6' The court would now determine the sentences based on all
facts established by a preponderance of the evidence.' 62
Other courts have developed a middle ground between the two possible
burdens of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt and by a preponderance of the
evidence. Judge Goodwin read Booker as requiring an initial determination of the
Guidelines sentence according to the Guidelines procedures, including the burden
of proof of preponderance of the evidence. However, in each case he then plans
to evaluate the evidence under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Where
the two results differ, he will consider the difference as an indication of the
degree of reliability of the Guidelines advisory sentence. Judge Goodwin also
155. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 Commentary (2005).
156. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
157. United States v. Revock, 353 F. Supp. 2d 127, 128 (D. Me. 2005) (citing United States v. Zompa,
326 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2004) and United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28,
2004)).
158. Id. (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244-45, 263-65 (2005)).
159. Id. at 129.
160. United States v. Penniegraft, 357 F. Supp. 2d 854, 856 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 857.
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said that although he does not believe the Crawford rule on confrontation applies
at sentencing, he will give greater weight, when facts are in dispute, to first hand
testimony rather than hearsay.'63
Acknowledging that numerous appellate cases have held that fact-finding by
a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate after Booker, Judge
Antoon of the Middle District of Florida issued a caveat similar to Judge
Goodwin's: "The variance between the preponderance of the evidence standard
and the reasonable doubt standard must necessarily bear, to some extent, on the
persuasive force of an advisory Guidelines range."' 6 Judge Antoon further
contended that this was consistent with the continuing principle that
determinations affecting one's liberty should be decided with exacting scrutiny. 1
65
As is the case regarding the degree of deference to be given to the advisory
Guidelines, judges are not always explicit in stating the reasoning behind the
manner in which they now determine a sentence. One court simply stated that
although a presentence investigation report found a loss figure of $8,000,000, the
court would not rely on this because the amount had not been admitted by the
defendant in his plea. 166 The court did not explain the basis for its decision.
The appellate courts that have considered the burden of proof after Booker
have held that fact-finding under a preponderance standard is constitutional.
67
However, no appellate court has yet said that a district court can not use a higher
burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit stated, "[t]he remedial portion of Booker
held that decisions about sentencing factors will continue to be made by judges,
on the preponderance of the evidence, an approach that comports with the sixth
amendment so long as the guideline system has some flexibility in application."'
168
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit announced in United States v. Mares that, "[t]he
Guideline range should be determined in the same manner as before
Booker/Fanfan.... The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance
163. "I strongly encourage the use of witness testimony and cross-examination to resolve factual
disputes at sentencing, notwithstanding my finding that Crawford does not apply at sentencing under the post-
Booker sentencing regime." U.S. v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 725 (S.D.W. Va. 2005).
164. United States v. Maali, No. CR-171ORL28KRS, 2005 WL 2204982, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8,
2005) (citing Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 723-24; United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 668 (S.D. Ohio
2005)).
165. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)).
166. United States v. West, 383 F. Supp. 2d 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
167. See, e.g., McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The remedial portion
of Booker held that decisions about sentencing factors will continue to be made by judges, on the
preponderance of the evidence, an approach that comports with the sixth amendment so long as the guideline
system has some flexibility in application."); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511,519 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The
sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination
of a Guideline sentencing range and all facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence.");
United States v. Guzman, 404 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2005); Cirilo-Munoz v. United States, 404 F.3d 527, 532-
33 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[A] finding under the Guidelines
must be based on reliable information and a preponderance of the evidence."); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d
543, 552 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005).
168. McReynolds, 307 F.3d at 481.
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of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination of a Guideline
sentencing range and all facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines
sentence." 1
69
Uncertainty remains, however, because just two weeks after the Fifth Circuit
announced in Mares that the preponderance of the evidence standard was
adequate, a district court within that jurisdiction held that Mares was not
controlling in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Shepard v.
United States. 70 The Supreme Court held that a police report could not be relied
on for enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act because that was a
fact that, absent a waiver by the defendant, had to be found by a jury . 71 The
district court stated, "this court must respectfully conclude that the even more
recent Supreme Court decision in Shepard requires that sentence enhancements
under the Guidelines require more than inferences drawn from a preponderance
of the evidence.' 72
Although in the minority, some district courts have held that the
preponderance of the evidence standard is inadequate for fact-finding at
sentencing post-Booker. Among such district courts, some require a beyond a
reasonable doubt burden of proof as a matter of preference while others say it is a
constitutional requirement. In United States v. Schuler, the district court held that
"it is up to the District Court's discretion as how to establish the factual basis for
the sentencing factors."' 73 The court went on to conclude that each sentencing
court could choose whether to have the jury find sentencing factors beyond a
reasonable doubt or find the sentencing factors itself by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Judge Marbly of Ohio stated that he believed enhancements should be
determined by beyond a reasonable doubt, but decided that, in light of the
consensus of appellate courts, he would use preponderance of the evidence for
enhancements not involving acquitted conduct.'74 For enhancements involving
acquitted conduct, he stated that the reasonable doubt standard should always be
used. Judge Marbly held that otherwise a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial is "eviscerated."'7 5 However, in determining the sentence in the case
before him, Judge Marbly concluded that he would not disregard the jury's
acquittal, since that would marginalize the jury and give the government an
unfair second opportunity to prove its case.76 Thus, Judge Marbly seemingly
refused to consider the acquitted conduct as a basis for enhancement under any
169. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519.
170. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
171. United States v. Harper, 360 F. Supp. 2d 833, 835 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
172. ld. at 836.
173. 373 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248 (D. Wyo. 2005).
174. United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661,668 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
175. Id. at 672.
176. Id.
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standard. Judge Friedman of the District of Columbia agreed that while most
factual issues at sentencing could be decided by a preponderance of the evidence,
acquitted conduct would have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, if it could
properly be considered at all.'77
Other courts insisting that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is required
have also relied on the Fifth Amendment's due process requirement. Judge
Bataillon of Nebraska held, "the Due Process Clause is implicated whenever a
judge determines a fact by a standard lower than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' if
that factual finding would increase the punishment above the lawful sentence that
could have been imposed absent that fact."'178 The court stated that "in order to
comply with due process in determining a reasonable sentence, [it] will require
that a defendant is afforded procedural protections under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments in connection with any facts on which the government seeks to rely
to increase a defendant's sentence.' ' 79 Judge Bataillon further held that a
defendant cannot waive the burden of proof.'8°Judge Bataillon acknowledged that
the line between a sentencing factor and an element of the crime was unclear
after Booker. He decided that the best course was to err on the side of avoiding a
constitutional problem and thus adopt sentencing procedures that complied with
Fifth and Sixth Amendments procedural safeguards. Judge Bataillon announced
that he would "require that facts that enhance a sentence are properly pled in an
indictment or information, and either admitted, or submitted to a jury (or to the
court if the right to a trial by jury is waived) for determination by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."'' Recognizing that this might not be required by Booker, the
court noted that it was not precluded. He further held that "it can never be
reasonable to base any significant increase in a defendant's sentence on facts that
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In the case under
consideration, the court decided that the government had not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had possessed a counterfeit device, as alleged
by the government and in the presentence report.'
82
In a subsequent methamphetamine case, Judge Bataillon applied this analysis
and limited the quantity of drugs for which the defendant could be sentenced to
that stated in the indictment and admitted to in the guilty plea. 8 3 Similarly, in a
counterfeiting case, the court based the offense level on the $800 in counterfeit
money to which the defendant pleaded guilty and declined to consider the
177. United States v. Baldwin, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2005).
178. United States v. Kelley, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1035 (D. Neb. 2005) (citing United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 319 n.6 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part)).
179. Coleman, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1039.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Rodriguez, No. 8:03CR36, 2005 WL 1319259 (D. Neb. June 3, 2005).
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additional $1320 attributed to the defendant in the presentence report. "' Judge
Bataillon noted in another case that applying an obstruction of justice
enhancement would violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due
process because the facts were not pled in the indictment or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.185
Judge Gertner is one of the judges who has interpreted Booker as the death
knell for Watts. In United States v. Pimental,'86 Judge Gertner concluded that the
holding in Booker logically requires abandoning Watts: "It makes absolutely no
sense to conclude that the Sixth Amendment is violated whenever facts essential
to sentencing have been determined by a judge rather than a jury... and also
conclude that the fruits of the jury's efforts can be ignored with impunity by the
judge in sentencing.' ' 7 Judge Gertner points out Justice Stevens statements in
Booker that in Watts the Supreme Court did not consider the Sixth Amendment
issue in that case.
Judge Gertner recognizes that other courts have found continued reliance on
acquitted conduct permissible after Booker, i.e., that Watts was not eroded, by
focusing on Justice Breyer's remedial portion of the majority opinion. But, she
argues that "[t]o consider acquitted conduct trivializes 'legal guilt' or 'legal
innocence."' 8 Judge Gertner contends that only in a completely indeterminate
sentencing scheme would it be acceptable to use the preponderance of the
evidence standard. The current system, however, is quite different because facts
have important consequences.
Judge Gertner next concludes that even if Watts is still valid, the appropriate
standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt because the advisory Guidelines
sentence plays a "critical role."' 8 9 Under Judge Gertner's view, the more limited
the freedom to sentence, the greater procedural protections there must be: "If the
Guidelines continue to be important, if facts the Guidelines make significant
continue to be extremely relevant, then Due Process requires procedural
safeguards and a heightened standard of proof, namely, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."19
One district court seems simply unwilling to accept Justice Breyer's remedial
opinion. Judge Holmes, of the Northern District of Oklahoma, issued an opinion
just nine days after Booker in which he essentially adopted Justice Stevens's
dissent as his procedure. Judge Holmes disagreed with Justice Breyer's remedial
opinion, saying "Itihe Court finds that the history of the Act dictates that any
184. United States v. Kwame Okai, No. 4:05CR19, 2005 WL 2042301 (D. Neb. Aug. 22, 2005).
185. United States v. Lozano, No. 8:03CR481, 2005 WL 3019488, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 10, 2005).
186. 367 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Mass. 2005).
187. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
188. Id. at 152.
189. Id. at 153.
190. Id. at 154.
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federal sentencing system should be mandatory."' 9 ' Judge Holmes announced that
he would continue to sentence according to his pre-Booker plan that included
accepting a guilty plea only when accompanied by a Sixth Amendment waiver of
jury trial that expressly applied to sentencing and judicial fact-finding at
sentencing with a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 1
92
The differing burdens of proof can make a significant difference in sentences
involving relevant conduct. A number of district courts believe Booker left
unanswered what is constitutionally required procedurally at sentencing,
particularly when the government asks that the defendant be sentenced based on
relevant conduct of which the defendant was acquitted. ' Some courts, looking to
Justice Stevens's majority opinion, believe that Watts is no longer good law and
acquitted conduct must, at a minimum, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 9
Other courts, looking to Justice Breyer's remedial opinion, believe that now that
the Guidelines are advisory, courts can and should decide relevant conduct issues
based on a preponderance of the evidence.' 95 Until this difference is resolved,
there will be disparities in sentences imposed under the two different standards.' 96
The district courts are clearly waiting for the Supreme Court to provide more
direction on the limits of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. With two new members
of the Court, that direction is even more difficult to predict.
C. Imposing Non-Guidelines Sentences
Once the district court has calculated the advisory Guidelines sentence, the
court has discretion to choose whether to impose that Guidelines sentence or
some other reasonable sentence after considering the factors of § 3553(a). This
section identifies when and why courts are choosing to impose non-Guidelines
sentences in certain cases. The first group of cases deals with perceived
disparities, issues that were vigorously litigated prior to Booker and resolved
either by the courts or by Congress. Their resolution, however, was without a
strong consensus among the judiciary. Consequently, with the new freedom
offered by Booker, some district courts have found the previous rule
unreasonable and applied a different standard. The second group of cases
presents fact patterns where a departure may have been available, but the court
chose to take the shortcut of considering what was a reasonable sentence under §
191. United States v. Barkley, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1315 (N.D. Okla. 2005).
192. Id. at 1318.
193. E.g., United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
194. E.g., United States v. Baldwin, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005).
195. E.g., United States v. Agostini, 365 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); United States v. Ferby, No.
00-DR-0053A, 2005 WL 154802 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005); United States v. Little, No. 3:02DR-27-H, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33935 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2005).
196. For a discussion of the two Booker opinions clashing on appeal, see Craig Green, Booker and
Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395 (2005).
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3553. The third group identifies cases in which a court found a factor that the
Guidelines have deemed "not normally relevant" and relied on it to impose a
lesser sentence. Cases in this group could easily overlap with those involving
potential departures. The final group is instances where the sentencing court
simply disagreed with the Guidelines sentence, based on the facts of the offense
itself. In each of these cases, the court judged the conduct to be less deserving of
punishment than the Guidelines did. In many of these non-Guidelines categories,
courts cite the "parsimony" provision of § 3553(a).
1. Disparity
While a key Guidelines goal, indeed perhaps Congress's overriding goal, was
to reduce unwarranted disparity, many district courts view the freedom granted
by Booker as allowing them to avoid disparities imposed by the Guidelines. Two
areas where many judges believe the Guidelines currently impose disparities are
"fast-track" sentencing for illegal immigration and the "100 to 1 ratio" for
calculating crack cocaine sentences in contrast with powder cocaine sentences.
Jurisdictions that have a "fast-track" program offer substantially reduced
sentences to defendants who promptly plead guilty to illegal reentry into the
United States. These programs originated with federal prosecutors in states
adjacent to Mexico that had tremendous numbers of reentry cases. 9 7 Under a fast-
track program, a defendant who pleaded guilty early in the case and waived
rights for motions and appeals could negotiate for a lower sentence through
charge bargaining or a downward departure. Congress codified fast-track
programs in the PROTECT Act of 2003.'98 Under these statutory provisions, the
Attorney General can authorize fast-track programs in jurisdictions where the
United States Attorney makes a request to have the program. The defendant must
admit the facts and waive rights to pretrial motions, appeal, and collateral attack.
In exchange, the government can recommend a four-level downward departure
under United States Sentencing Guideline section 5K3. 1. Although fast-track
programs originated in states bordering Mexico, they are now available in an odd
collection of jurisdictions including Nebraska, North Dakota, and the Northern
District of Georgia.' 99 There remain, however, fast-track programs outside of
those authorized by the PROTECT Act that allow charge bargaining, potentially
resulting in even greater decreases.
Some judges found the disparate sentences available for defendants
convicted of illegal entry in fast-track jurisdictions troubling even before Booker.
But, appellate courts consistently upheld the sentences.2°° After Booker, however,
197. United States v. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1267 (D. Utah 2005).
198. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 101 et. seq., 117 Stat. 65 (2003).
199. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 697-705 (2d Cir. 2000).
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judges have raised their concerns anew. In United States v. Medrano-Duran,
Judge Kennelly of the Northern District of Illinois determined that the
defendant's sentence of fifty-seven to seventy-one months under the Guidelines
would range from thirty-seven months to sixty-three months under a fast-track
program, depending on the jurisdiction in which he was prosecuted.20 ' The court
concluded that the disparity between the Guidelines sentence and the sentences
available under fast-track programs was an unwarranted disparity among
similarly situated defendants under § 3553(a)(6) 2 The court stated, "[tjhere is
nothing in § 3553, Booker, or any other existing authority to support a
construction of § 3553(a)(6) that allows Congress and prosecutors to determine
what sentence disparities are warranted and unwarranted but prevents a court
from doing So. , °23 Accordingly, the court reduced the defendant's Guidelines
range by three offense levels and imposed a sentence of forty-one months.
Judge Adelman first discussed the fast-track problem in United States v.
Galvez-Barrios. 204 In sentencing below the advisory Guidelines sentence for
illegal reentry by a defendant with a prior aggravated felony conviction, Judge
Adelman considered three key factors. First, Judge Adelman determined that the
defendant's prior aggravated felony (aggravated battery) was not deserving of the
sixteen-level increase in the offense level in part because of the specific
circumstances of the prior felony.25 Second, Judge Adelman looked at the history
of the amendment that provided for the sixteen-level enhancement for a prior
conviction for an aggravated felony. Seemingly persuaded in part by a law
review article, Judge Adelman noted that the significant enhancement was not the
result of research, but was simply approval of a sentencing commissioner's
suggestion. °6 Third, Judge Adelman addressed the disparity between districts
with fast-track programs and those that did not have such programs. He
concluded that "it may be appropriate in some cases for [a] court to exercise...
[its] discretion to minimize the sentencing disparity that fast-track programs
create. ' 207 Thus, the court imposed a sentence of twenty-four months, a four-level
reduction. In a subsequent case, however, Judge Adelman declined to sentence
below the advisory Guidelines, despite the defendant's request, based on fast-
201. United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (N.D. I. 2005).
202. The court noted that the fast-track programs were not limited to districts with high numbers of
illegal reentry cases. Prosecutors offices in Oregon, Idaho, Nebraska, and North Dakota handled only a few
reentry cases a year but had fast-track programs. Id. at 947.
203. Id.
204. 355 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
205. The circumstances of the earlier case were that the defendant shot a man while trying to recover his
property that the man and his associates had stolen from the defendant. Given these facts, Judge Adelman
concluded that the defendant was not a danger to society because he committed no crimes other than illegal
entry in the past twelve years. Id. at 964.
206. Id. at 962 (citing James P. Fleissner & James A Shapiro, Sentencing Illegal Aliens Convicted of
Reentry After Deportation: A Proposal for Simplified and Principled Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 264,268
(1996)).
207. Id. at 963.
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track disparity. In United States v. Peralta-Espinoza,2 Judge Adelman held that
the thirty-month Guidelines sentence was appropriate because the defendant had
reentered the United States to commit drug offenses.2
Presented with a fast-track disparity case with compelling facts, Judge
Cassell of Utah "reluctantly" concluded that he should not vary from the
Guidelines because that would ignore Congress's directive in the PROTECT Act
that only the Attorney General can authorize fast-track programs. 2 0 He reasoned
that although the programs clearly caused sentencing disparity among similar
defendants, Congress could conclude the benefits of quickly processing lots of
illegal reentry cases outweighed the disparities. Thus, any disparity was arguably
not "unwarranted." 2 ' The defendant in question was subject to a Guidelines
sentence of eighteen to twenty-four months incarceration that would have been
reduced to ten to sixteen months in a fast-track program with a three-level
reduction. He had reentered the United States only at his wife's urging, because
she was dealing with overwhelming family burdens, including a premature infant
and a terminally ill grandfather. Judge Cassell further noted that a fast-track
program would have been available in Utah, but the Attorney General had denied
the request of the United States Attorney for Utah to have one. Judge Cassell,
while adhering to the Guidelines on this issue, urged "action to reduce the
geographical differences," noting, "the appearance of justice is not well served
when the length of time a man spends in prison turns, without clear explanation,
on the happenstance of the district in which he is arrested."' 12 Ultimately, Judge
Cassell departed from the sentence, based on extraordinary family circumstances,
and sentenced the defendant to eight months.1 3
While the fast-track disparity issue is relatively new, the crack to powder
cocaine ratio of 100 to 1 dates back almost twenty years and has affected
sentences in thousands of cases. This disparity has been extensively analyzed by
scholars and the United. States Sentencing Commission . In the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 Congress established that one gram of crack cocaine would
be treated the same as 100 grams of powder cocaine in determining mandatory
minimum sentences. 2" The Commission relied on the mandatory minimums of
that statute when it established the offense levels for crack cocaine and powder
cocaine under the Guidelines. It subsequently reconsidered the discrepancy many
times. In 1995, the Commission recommended treating crack cocaine and powder
208. 383 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
209. United States v. Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Va. 2005).
210. United States v. Perez-Chavez, No. 2:05-CR-00003PGC. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252, at *1-2.
211. Id. at *23. (May 16, 2005).
212. Id. at*23.
213. Id. at *43.
214. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY (2002).
215. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-570, § 1001, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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cocaine equally, but Congress disapproved the proposed amendment. In 1997,
the Commission urged Congress to consider alternatives, but Congress did not. In
2002, the Commission again asked Congress to correct this disparity, concluding
in its report that the great difference in punishment is unwarranted and
disparately impacts Blacks. As one court noted, "it is virtually impossible to find
any authority suggesting a principled basis for the current disparity in
sentences." 26
With Booker's ruling that the Guidelines are advisory, judges have been able
to reconsider the 100 to 1 ratio for crack cocaine. In what appears to be the first
published opinion after Booker discussing the issue, United States v. Smith,"'
Judge Adelman rejected the 100 to 1 ratio. Judge Adelman held that imposing a
sentence where crack was deemed the equivalent of one hundred grams of
powder cocaine was unreasonable and created unwarranted disparity. In support
of his determination that the 100 to 1 ratio was unreasonable, Judge Adelman
cited cases and articles concluding that the disparity lacked "persuasive
penological or scientific justification and creates a racially disparate impact in
federal sentencing. ' He also emphasized the Commission's conclusion that
there is no basis for the ratio of 100 to 1. Instead of the 100 to 1 ratio, Judge
Adelman decided to apply a 20 to 1 ratio, which had been suggested by the
Commission but rejected by Congress.
211In the subsequent case of United States v. Leroy, Judge Adelman said that
in using the 20 to 1 ratio he was relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which grants
courts discretion to assess whether the Guideline range is greater than necessary
to meet the purposes of sentencing, and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which allows
courts to sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity. Because application of the
Guidelines would have created unwarranted disparity among defendants who had
been found guilty of similar conduct, and would have resulted in a sentence
greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),
the court imposed a non-Guideline sentence using a 20 to 1 crack to cocaine
ratio.22° Many other courts have also applied this 20 to 1 ratio, often citing
Smith.
221
216. United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 303 (D.R.I. 2005).
217. 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
218. Id. at 777.
219. 373 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
220. See also United States v. Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d 878 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (applying a 20 to 1
ratio).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, No. 03 Cr. 835, 2005 WL 1214280 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005);
Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (providing a lengthy discussion of the Commission's conclusions about the crack
disparity); United States v. Stukes, No. 03 CR. 601, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23394 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2005)
(using a 20 to 1 ratio with no discussion of it except citing Smith).
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Other courts have agreed that the 100 to 1 ratio is unreasonable and have
imposed an even smaller ratio.2 ' In United States v. Fisher, the court used a 10 to
1 ratio to calculate the defendant's Guideline sentence. 223 The court noted several
of the concerns discussed by Judge Adelman, but also expressed concern that
defendants being sentencing for crack offenses rarely received safety valve
treatment that would allow them to escape the mandatory minimum. The
difficulty, of course, is that there is now great disparity for defendants who are
sentenced for possession for sale or possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine based on the 100 to 1 ratio versus the 20 to 1 ratio, or the even lower 10
to 1 ratio.
Other courts may impose a non-Guidelines sentence in a crack cocaine case
without specifically stating a substitute ratio.224 In United States v. Nellum, the
court emphasized the § 3553(a) factors that led it to impose a sentence of 108
months instead of a sentence in the Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. 225 The
court noted that the defendant would be sixty-five by the time of his release, an
unlikely age for recidivism, and also emphasized the crack versus cocaine
sentencing disparity.226 The court concluded that it did not need to identify an
alternative to the 100 to 1 ratio because the court relied on the "myriad" of other
§ 3553 factors in determining the actual sentence.227
Some judges who believe the crack-cocaine ratio is too extreme have still
chosen to follow the Guidelines. One court said:
[J]udge-made changes to the crack Guidelines, while sometimes
principled, are (1) undemocratic, and (2) not plainly superior to the
judgments of Congress. We should maintain the status quo when
exercising our Booker discretion within the conte xt of the crack cocaine
Guidelines because we are judges and not legislators and because the
status quo is what Congress has chosen. When it comes to the severity of
221punishment, Congress has the right to be wrong.
In a direct response to this argument, another court stated, "the Guidelines
are not an act of Congress. Furthermore, they are no longer mandatory according
222. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 1076243 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005). The
ratio in Clay was not specified, nor was the quantity on which the court based the sentence, but it had to be
between 5 to I and 20 to 1.
223. United States v. Fisher, No. 01 CR 543 -1, -2, -3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23184 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11,
2005).
224. See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
225. United States v. Nellum, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 300073 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2005).
226. Id. at *3-4.
227. Id.
228. United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060 (D. Neb. 2005) (footnote omitted); see also
United States v. Cooper, No. 01 CR 543 -1, -2, -3, 2005 LEXIS 16745 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2005) (considering an
earlier sentencing that was remanded, the court said it was for Congress to change the crack-powder disparity,
not the court).
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to the Supreme Court's decision in Booker., 2 9 Still, other courts are imposing
sentences with the 100 to 1 ratio, finding in the particular case that the advisory
Guidelines sentence is reasonable, without determining whether it is reasonable
in all cases.230
Relying on Booker, district courts have claimed the opportunity to consider
anew what constitutes unreasonable disparity. The above discussion considers
disparity imposed by particular guidelines. A court can also employ a non-
Guidelines sentence to avoid what the court perceives to be potential
unwarranted disparity between the defendant currently being sentenced and a co-
defendant. In United States v. Strange, the court imposed a sentence of twenty-
one months rather than the Guidelines sentence of twenty-seven to thirty-three
months because co-defendants had received fifteen and eighteen months
respectively, even though their lower sentences were due to section 5Kl
substantial assistance departures.23'
2. Alternative to Finding Departures
Some district courts are using the advisory Guidelines decreed by Booker to
essentially grant departures while avoiding direct review of them. For example,
in considering the sentence for a sixty-nine-year-old defendant who pleaded
guilty to three counts of distribution of Oxycontin, the court recognized that the
defendant's multiple, severe health problems, including the fact that she was now
confined to a wheelchair, could be a basis for a downward departure from the
Guidelines range of ninety-seven to 121 months.232 The court noted that such a
departure required the court to determine that the Bureau of Prisons was unable
to accommodate the medical problems. Finding the record silent on this matter,
the court concluded that the Bureau of Prisons would be able to meet some of the
23defendant's needs and thus, held a downward departure was not appropriate.
The court went on to impose a non-Guidelines sentence of probation. 234 This
seems to be a clear case of a court using discretionary sentencing as a shortcut.
The court avoided the more lengthy process of gathering evidence to determine
whether the Bureau of Prisons could provide adequate care, as well as the
possibility of a finding of inadequate basis for the departure, given how much the
sentence was decreased.
Another court was asked to depart downward from the fifty-seven to seventy-
one-month Guidelines sentence because one of the crimes for which the
229. United States v. Fisher, No.S3 03 CR 1501, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23184, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
11,2005).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Tenn. 2005).
231. United States v. Strange, 370 F. Supp. 2d 644 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
232. United States v. Seiber, No. 4:04-CR-28, 2005 WL 180164, at *1 -3 (E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2005).
233. Id.
234. Id. at *4.
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defendant was convicted, possession of a semiautomatic assault rifle, was no
longer a crime by the time of the sentencing. 2 ' Rather than deciding if such a
departure was appropriate, the court opted to impose a "reasonable sentence" of
forty months, which was in the Guidelines range for the remaining counts of
conviction.236 Similarly, in United States v. Toback,237 the court issued a
non-Guidelines sentence because of the impact the defendant's incarceration
would have had on his employees, even though a downward departure had been
allowed in a similar case in the same circuit.
In United States v. Huerta Rodriguez,23 the defendant was charged with
illegal reentry into the United States after having been deported following
conviction for an aggravated felony. The defendant's criminal history category
was V due to multiple misdemeanor convictions for driving while intoxicated.
The court noted that had the Guidelines still been mandatory, it would have
granted a downward departure for the criminal history category. Because the
Guidelines are now advisory, the court could sentence the defendant to a lower
sentence based on reasonableness and the § 3553 factors, without any concern for
review of the determination that grant departures.
39
A court may rely on the advisory nature of the Guidelines as a backup to a
departure. In United States v. Pineyro,24° Judge Gertner granted a downward
departure to a defendant who suffered from a severe bone disease after finding
that the Bureau of Prisons could not adequately care for him; she granted another
downward departure for diminished capacity due to brain damage the defendant
received in a car accident. Granting a total downward departure of nine levels,
Judge Gertner sentenced the defendant to probation. Judge Gertner expressly
noted in the written Case Summary that she would reach the same sentence under
the reasonableness standard of Booker.4' Thus, even if an appellate court were to
find a departure improper, the sentence could still be found reasonable.
3. Considering Factors "Not Ordinarily Relevant" Under the Guidelines
A third category of non-Guidelines sentences is where the court considers
factors that the Guidelines deem not ordinarily relevant. These factors include
personal characteristics such as age, education and vocational skills, mental and
emotional conditions, physical condition or appearance, drug or alcohol
dependence or abuse, gambling addiction, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, military service, civic, charitable, or public service and similar
235. United States v. Mullins, 356 F. Supp. 2d 617,619 (W.D. Va. 2005).
236. Id. at 620-21.
237. No. 01 Cr. 410, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6778 (Apr. 19, 2005).
238. 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (D. Neb. 2005).
239. Id.
240. 372 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Mass. 2005).
241. Id. at 138.
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prior good works, lack of guidance as a youth, and circumstances indicating a
disadvantaged upbringing. 42 A review of post-Booker cases provides examples
of each of these being a basis for a reduced, non-Guidelines sentence.
In United States v. Phillips,243 the defendant was convicted of transporting six
hundred kilograms of marijuana while working as a long distance trucker
transporting broccoli. The court gave the defendant a downward adjustment of
four levels for his role as a minimal participant. This resulted in a Guidelines
sentence of fifty-two to sixty-three months. The court cited the defendant's
"relatively advanced age" of fifty-eight and sentenced the defendant to thirty
months incarceration. 24 The court concluded that because of the defendant's age
and his minimal involvement he would not commit another crime. The court did
not discuss the fact that age was deemed not normally relevant by the Guidelines.
Another case involving a non-Guidelines sentence where age was a factor
was United States v. Nellum.245 Nellum was convicted of distribution of five
grams or more of cocaine base. The quantity sold on the count of conviction was
twenty-seven grams, but with the inclusion of relevant conduct the court found
Nellum responsible for 204 grams. The court determined the defendant's
Guidelines range was 168 to 210 months. The court sentenced the defendant to
108 months after considering the § 3553(a) factors. The court noted that the
defendant's age of fifty-seven "weighed heavily in mitigating the defendant's
sentence. 246 The court noted that the defendant would be sixty-five when he was
released from prison and concluded that the likelihood of recidivism at that time
was very low. The court also considered the defendant's good relationship with
his children, his drug addiction, his serious medical problems, his past military
service, and the nature of the offense, including the crack to cocaine powder
disparity. The court noted that age, family ties, medical problems, and military
service are all deemed not normally relevant by the Guidelines.241
Youthful age was a significant factor in United States v. Gall.248 The
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute ecstasy. His
Guidelines range was thirty to thirty-seven months. In sentencing the defendant
to probation, the court considered several factors under § 3553(a). The court
noted that all of the defendant's criminal activity had occurred when he was
twenty-one years old, or younger, that he voluntarily withdrew from the drug
conspiracy, and that his behavior since his departure from the conspiracy was
excellent, including graduating from college and starting his own business. In
considering the defendant's age, the court noted recent psychological studies
242. United States v. Booker, 534 U.S. 220 (2005); see also supra notes 14-19.
243. 368 F. Supp. 1259 (D.N.M. 2005).
244. Id.
245. No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 205 WL 300073 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2005).
246. Id. at *3.
247. Id. at *4-5.
248. 374 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
indicating that the human brain may not be complete until the age of twenty-five
and the Supreme Court's determination that, at least with respect to capital
offenses, adolescents are less culpable for their actions than adults.
In a case of possession of firearms after having been committed to a mental
institution, a forty-nine year-old defendant had no prior criminal record, not even
an arrest, but had a lengthy history of mental illness.49 Under the Guidelines, the
sentence would be twelve to eighteen months incarceration. The defendant, the
government, and the probation officer all requested a departure to permit home
confinement and credit the seven months already served, based on mental and
emotional condition, diminished capacity, post-offense rehabilitation, and
multiple circumstances. The court decided that the departure was not warranted
by the Guidelines, concluding in part that the defendant's mental condition fell
within Guidelines section 5H1.3's admonition that mental conditions are not
normally relevant. Instead, the court imposed the sentence requested-five
months of home confinement to complete the twelve month sentence-as a non-
Guidelines sentence. In reaching this sentence, the court considered several
§ 3553(a) factors, including § 3553(a)(2)(D) (the need for medical care),
§ 3553(a)(2)(C) (protection of the public), and § 3553(a)(1) (the nature and
circumstances of the offense and history of the defendant).50 In considering the
protection of the public, the court concluded that continuing the defendant's
medical treatment would better serve the public in the long run. The court was
also able to take into account the defendant's ignorance of the law, even though
2511that was not a legal defense to the crime.
The advisory Guidelines thus also allow a judge to interpret provisions of
§ 3553 in a way different from the Guidelines. For example, one purpose of
sentencing is to protect the public from future crimes. The Guidelines achieve
this goal by imposing greater sentences of incarceration for more serious crimes.
Under advisory guidelines, as demonstrated above, a judge is free to determine
that it is in the best long-term interest of the public to not impose a longer
sentence, and instead, to promote a treatment plan.252 Or, the court may conclude
the chance of recidivism by an older defendant is slight.
What may prove more problematic are cases where the court sentences a
defendant substantially below the Guidelines due to a host of other factors. In
United States v. Gener,253 the defendant was subject to a Guidelines sentence of
87 to 108 months for selling heroin. The court sentenced him to five years of
supervised release, citing his difficult childhood, his major learning disability, his
drug addiction, and family difficulties including the death of his father.254
249. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D. Me. 2005).
250. Id. at 26.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 22.
253. No. 04 Cr. 424-17, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25764 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2005).
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In the case of United States v. Kacvinsky,255 the court imposed a sentence of
probation rather than eighteen to twenty-four months incarceration in part
because the defendant had lost his job as a police officer and lost related benefits.
Although the court did not explicitly say so, it seemed to consider these losses as
adequate punishment for the offense.
In each of the above cases, the court fashioned a sentence it believed was
reasonable based on § 3553 factors. In each case, at least one factor that was
considered was deemed not normally relevant by the Guidelines. Most of the
judges took care to explain why the factor was relevant in the particular case and
conducted a thoughtful analysis. Many other courts, however, are declining to
consider facts deemed by the Guidelines to be not normally relevant, even though
they may be factors under § 3553. Consequently, defendants with the same
characteristics may receive the benefit of a downward adjustment from one
judge, but not from another, because it is outside the Guidelines. Hopefully, the
Commission will monitor these cases and consider issues, such as declining
recidivism with advancing age, in formulating future guidelines.
4. Disagreement with Specific Guidelines Results
Judges may also impose a non-Guidelines sentence to avoid application of a
particular provision of the Guidelines that they believe results in a sentence
greater than necessary under § 3553(a). For example, United States Sentencing
Guideline section 2K2.1 provides that, for a conviction of a felon possessing a
firearm, the penalties are escalated based on offenses committed within ten years
of the firearms possession. In a case where the possession extended back more
than ten years, and thus encompassed crimes from almost twenty years earlier,
the court calculated the sentence according to the Guidelines, which resulted in a
sentencing range of forty-one to fifty-one months.5 6 Calculating the sentence by
extending only ten years back from the date of the discovery of the weapons,
rather than from the date of their initial possession, the sentence would have been
ten to sixteen months.257 The court imposed twenty-one months as the reasonable
sentence under § 3553.
In United States v. Bitsilly,28 the defendant was charged with criminal sexual
abuse of a minor under the age of sixteen, The court found that at the time of the
offense the thirty-five year-old defendant and the fifteen year-old victim had a
consensual sexual relationship.2 59 At sentencing, the court noted that they now
had an infant daughter and that both of their families supported their continuing
relationship. The defendant's only other criminal behavior involved minor
255. No. 1:05 CR 363, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34933 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2005).
256. United States v. Frappier, 377 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226-27 (D. Me. 2005).
257. Id. at 222.
258. 386 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D.N.M. 2005).
259. Id. at 1196.
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alcohol-related offenses. The court found that there was no danger to the public
because the defendant had no history of child sexual abuse. The court concluded
that the advisory Guidelines sentence of eighteen to twenty-four months was
greater than necessary and imposed probation. The court noted, "I have not
[seen] anything like this in my eleven years on the bench. I do not believe that
the Sentencing Commission contemplated such a situation when formulating the
relevant Guideline provision. ' 26
In United States v. Jaber2 1' defendant Momoh pleaded guilty to an
indictment charging him with possessing and distributing pseudoephedrine while
knowing it would be used to make a controlled substance. Judge Gertner
calculated his Guidelines sentence as fifty-seven to seventy-one months after
factoring all available departures. She imposed a sentence of two years probation
because he was a low-level employee who received no profit. Also, the court
considered his excellent record on presentence release, during which time he
cared for his four young children while his wife was ill. As in many of the cases
in which a non-Guidelines sentence is imposed, the court cited the parsimony
phrase of § 3553(a): "The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary. 26 2
Each of these cases illustrates a way in which a court might find a sentence
outside the Guidelines range. In the first, the court believed that the inclusion of
remote criminal conduct overstated the culpability of the defendant when the
Guidelines were applied. In the second, the court believed the unique
circumstances of the case, which the court emphasized were extraordinary, made
it a much less serious crime. In the third, the court factored in the impact of the
sentence on the defendant's family and also relied on personal characteristics to
judge that there was little need for specific deterrence.
IV. SENTENCING THEMES IN POST-BOOKER SENTENCINGS
The overriding conclusion from reviewing hundreds of post-Booker
sentencing opinions is that district court judges are carefully, thoughtfully
sentencing under Booker. Of course, the available written statements of reasons
for sentencings represent only a fraction of the federal sentencings that have
occurred post-Booker.263 But, the available memoranda consistently demonstrate
that judges are carefully considering the now advisory Guidelines sentences and
usually have clear reasons for imposing non-Guidelines sentences. Judges are
260. Id. at 1198.
261. 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2005).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1984).
263. Reviewing available sentencing memoranda can provide a distorted view as one learns much about
the thoughts of the prolific writers and nothing about the judges who do not provide written sentencing
memoranda. For example, included in the review of sentencing memoranda for this article were more than
twenty written by Judge Adelman. Also, it seems likely that the judges most likely to provide written
explanations are those who are sentencing outside the Guidelines.
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aware that these early opinions will be scrutinized. Some caution that Congress is
watching.266 Others urge that Congress consider these opinions part of a
dialogue. 265 And lest someone label them soft or hard on defendants, some even
remind us in an opinion that they have sentenced both above and below the
266Guidelines in varying cases.
The concerns that emerge from all of these cases reflect the themes identified
in decades of discretionary sentencing. First, a sentencer must assess the harm
caused.267 Under the Guidelines, the Commission, sometimes in response to
Congress's specific legislation, has calculated the harmfulness of each crime in
its designation of the base offense level.266 Most of the time courts accept this
estimation but they reject what they believe are false assessments of harm. This is
the case with the crack versus powder cocaine disparity. No court seems to
believe that the tremendously longer sentences for crack cocaine accurately
reflect the seriousness of the crime. While some courts are still willing to defer to
Congress's judgment on the matter, many others are not. Similarly, courts are
troubled by fast-track programs where the sentence imposed is a consequence of
the locale of prosecution rather than an assessment of harm. Some courts have
more broadly expressed distrust of the Guidelines in drug cases where the
reliance on quantity may overstate culpability or where sentences are
substantially longer now than they were historically. 269 Thus, these cases call for
Congress and the Commission to reassess the harm calculated by the Guidelines
in these few areas.
Courts are also concerned with substituting a judicial determination of harm
for the jury's determination, through the application of relevant conduct
provisions. This is especially troubling with acquitted conduct on two grounds.
District courts worry about the message sent by a criminal justice system that
essentially disregards the jury's verdict if it is for acquittal. And courts are also
concerned about imposing a deprivation of liberty when evidence has been tested
only by the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Under discretionary
sentencing courts could weigh evidence of harm as they chose; although, with no
norms, this inevitably led to differing applications by different judges. With
discretionary sentencing, there has been a slight re-emergence of this opportunity
to weigh the evidence, but this may soon be limited by higher courts.
264. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 931-32 (D. Utah 2005).
265. Judge Adelman's hope is that district court sentencing decisions accompanied by written opinions
become one part of the dialogue with the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 986.
266. See, e.g., United States v. Kacvinsky, No. 1:05 DR 363, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35933 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 22, 2005).
267. For a full discussion of this model of discretionary sentencing, see STANTON WHEELER ET AL.,
SIrlTNG IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).
268. Terrance F. MacCarthy & Nancy B. Mumighan, Symposium on the Seventh Circuit as a Criminal
Court: The Seventh Circuit and Departures from the Sentencing Guidelines: Sentencing by Numbers, 67 CHI.-
KENTL. REV. 51,63-64 (1991).
269. United States v. Kelley, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (D. Neb. 2005).
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Once the court determines the harm it must decide how blameworthy the
defendant is. Blameworthiness traditionally included such factors as intent,
relative culpability among multiple defendants, and whether the defendant
cooperated or covered up a crime. Sometimes courts also considered personal
information to try to make a judgment of character. Under the Guidelines, some
aspects of blameworthiness are taken into account, such as cooperation and, to a
limited extent, culpability among multiple defendants. But, the Guidelines
basically judge blameworthiness on two determinants-the act committed and
the defendant's criminal history-permitting nowhere near the flexibility that
existed in discretionary sentencing. In considering the act, judges generally
assign blameworthiness by a single fact, such as quantity of drugs. However,
district courts know that quantity does not necessarily indicate one's place in a
distribution hierarchy and they may want to make a more individual assessment
of who is the kingpin in an organization. With respect to the defendant's criminal
history, courts sometimes find that this receives too much weight in the
Guidelines calculation. Under discretionary sentencing, courts routinely
considered all aspects of a defendant's life. Courts looked beyond the crime of
conviction and considered factors such as mental illness, youth, and even
addiction. The Guidelines have designated these factors as not normally relevant.
Thus, post-Booker cases where courts are imposing non-Guidelines sentences
based on facts not normally relevant may be adjusting the assessment of
blameworthiness.
The third stage of discretionary sentencing was assessing the consequence of
a sentence on the defendant, others in contact with the defendant, and the public.
This entailed both determining the social cost of the sentence and calculating its
deterrent effect, both specific and general. This aspect of sentencing was often
very utilitarian, encompassing the concept now presented in the "parsimony"
clause to not impose a sentence longer than necessary. This necessarily requires
courts to determine what sentence is necessary, both for punishment and for
deterrence. Some courts, obviously focusing on general deterrence, argued that
Congress and the Commission are better suited to decide what level of
punishment would deter. 20 But other courts have focused on individual
deterrence and responded that only the trial court can assess the individual to try
to determine what is necessary to deter that person from committing another
crime. The assessment of individual deterrence leads to consideration of
additional factors deemed not normally relevant by the Guidelines, such as
education, employment history, and family and community ties. The
determination of what punishment is appropriate can also vary if the court factors
in the consequences of that punishment on others, such as family members and
the community, both factors that the Guidelines believe are not normally
270. E.g., United States v. Perez-Chavez, No. 2:05-CR-00003PGC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252 (D.
Utah May 16, 2005).
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relevant. Thus, with a renewal of discretion, some courts are again taking into
account the impact of the sentence and factoring in personal circumstances that
can lead one court to impose a lighter sentence than another because of the
impact of the potential sentence. The danger here is the re-emergence of
sentencing based on an individual judge's values, such as routinely imposing
lesser sentences for those who served in the military. The Commission might
want to reconsider having more areas of gradation to account for these factors in
a controlled way. For example, while caring for family members may not
normally be relevant, caring for a seriously handicapped or ill child might be
designated relevant. Without such gradation, this area is ripe for unwarranted
disparity.
When courts disagree about the degree of deference to give the Guidelines it
is largely because they disagree about how well the Guidelines have met the
goals of § 3553 and thus considered the traditional themes of sentencing.
Congress and the Commission can raise the level of confidence in judges by
responding to the key issues. For some issues, there will be no consensus. Judges
are not monolithic and Congress is in part driven by politics. And there is a
continuing balancing act between affording proportionality and minimizing
disparity. But, these early cases suggest there is tremendous consensus under the
discretionary Guidelines and much of the discord could be abated with a few key
changes to the Guidelines. As the Commission has long championed, the crack to
powder disparity should be erased or substantially reduced. Similarly, the fast-
track programs should either be applied nationwide or at least assigned
geographically based on some coherent reasoning, such as overwhelming
numbers of cases in relation to resources. These changes alone would account for
a substantial number of non-Guidelines sentences. The severity of drug sentences
should also be reviewed. If Congress chooses not to act, then it will be up to the
appellate courts to decide whether district courts can impose different standards
such as for crack to powder ratios, under the reasonableness standard. But, truly
avoiding disparity in sentencing under discretionary guidelines requires
consensus. Where the Guidelines do not reflect the actual consensus of the
courts, there will be tension and sentencing differences.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined and explained how federal district judges are using
their recently decreed freedom to sentence. Taking a long view, the issues this
article identifies may be considered symptoms of the lack of a coherent
sentencing philosophy to guide federal sentencing law. Some commentators
believe that until we resolve that any sentencing scheme is doomed to failure.
But, for the short term, studying these cases demonstrates that federal district
judges disagree about a few key areas: what weight to give the Guidelines, what
standards should be applied for fact-finding at sentencing, where courts believe
the Guidelines impose, rather than reduce, disparity, and what factors the courts
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believe are inadequately considered in the Guidelines. And, in all of these cases,
there remains the tension between the Guidelines' goals of imposing consistent
sentences for similar conduct and tailoring a sentence to fit an individual's
circumstances, which was the judge's role for so many decades before guidelines
sentences.
This review of district court decisions might lead one to expect that statistical
analysis of post-Booker sentences would show significant changes, such as a
pattern of shorter sentences where judges have used a higher burden of proof,
declined to consider acquitted conduct, and exercised discretion in other ways
that decreased a defendant's offense level. However, the data thus far does not
indicate any significant decline in the length of sentences imposed. 27,
The current advisory guidelines system-though accomplished by a
circuitous route of Congressional legislation, years of testing the limits of
mandatory guidelines, and ultimately their disapproval by an extremely divided
Supreme Court-has actually come very close to the ideal of reform that was
held by Senator Kennedy and many others in the 1970s. This moment affords
Congress the opportunity to consider that the freedom to sentence under a
reasonableness standard with advisory guidelines has not resulted in dramatically
different sentences than under the Guidelines. Allowing judges to continue to
sentence in the current post-Booker model for a significant period of time will
provide the best information to assess whether advisory guidelines will work for
federal sentencing. District courts can provide a dialogue for Congress and the
Commission through sentencing memoranda and case law that develops through
the appellate process. The reform movement of the 1970s, spurred by judges,
academics, and legislators, emphasized the need for benchmark standards and
individualized sentencing. There was also recognition of the important role
appellate review of sentencing can serve to promote uniformity. For the first
time, district courts today have guidelines, appellate review, and now the
freedom to sentence.
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